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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 03-3368
____________
RICHARD C. BROBST,
                  Appellant
        v.
*JOANNE B. BARNHART,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
        *(Pursuant to Rule 43(c), F.R.A.P.)
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 01-cv-02464)
District Judge:  Honorable William L. Standish
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 1, 2004
Before:  ALITO, FISHER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Filed:  April 27, 2004)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
2FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Richard Brobst appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance
benefits for a closed period from October 1, 1998, through June 4, 2001.  Brobst
challenges the Administrative Law Judge’s determinations that he had engaged in
substantial gainful activity (SGA) for the initial portion of the claimed benefits period,
that he retained a residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform sedentary work in a low-
stress environment, and that he was capable of performing jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy.  We affirm the district court’s judgment as it was based
on substantial evidence.
From 1969 through 1998, Brobst was continuously employed in various capacities. 
On August 14, 1997, and without warning, Brobst became disoriented while driving to
work.  He forgot where he was going and eventually had to call his wife to help him get
home.  Following this incident, Brobst began treatment with a psychiatrist, Dr. Robert
Lanz.  Dr. Lanz treated Brobst throughout the closed period, diagnosed him with clinical
depression, and deemed him unable to sustain employment.  Brobst’s application for
disability benefits was denied initially and on reconsideration.  The ALJ subsequently
found that Brobst was not disabled, a decision affirmed by the district court.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review “is identical to that of
the District Court, namely to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support
3the Commissioner’s decision.”  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999).  The
Commissioner applies the five-step analysis set forth in the regulations promulgated by
the Social Security Administration in assessing whether a claimant is disabled.  See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520.
Brobst challenges the ALJ’s step one, four and five conclusions – that Brobst
engaged in SGA for part of the closed period (step one), retained a RFC to perform light
work (step four), and was capable of performing other jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy (step five).  SGA is “work activity that involves doing
significant physical or mental activities” for pay or profit.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a), (b). 
Work performed will not demonstrate an ability to perform SGA “if, after working for a
period of 6 months or less, your impairment forced you to stop working or to reduce the
amount of work you do so that your earnings from such work fall below the [SGA]
earnings level in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.”  Id. at § 404.1574(c).  Earnings may
show that one has performed SGA; in Brobst’s case, had his average monthly earnings
through June 1999, and between July 1999 and September 1999, equaled or exceeded
$500 and $700, respectively, this would be strong evidence that he engaged in SGA.
Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings that Brobst had worked more
than six months prior to his impairment forcing him to stop or reduce working. 
Moreover, even if we agree with Brobst that nearly $20,000 of the earnings reflected on
4his tax records should not be considered in computing his average monthly earnings, the
remaining amount of earnings comfortably exceeds the regulatory earnings thresholds.
Brobst’s challenge to the ALJ’s step-four analysis – its decision that Brobst had
the RFC to perform light work – rests primarily on his contention that the ALJ erred in
refusing to give controlling weight to the opinion of his treating physician, Dr. Lanz, that
Brobst had been unable to hold sustained employment since 1997.  There is no question
that an ALJ must give controlling weight to the medical opinion of a treating physician
where the opinion is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the]
case record.”  20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2).
The ALJ’s refusal to give controlling weight to Dr. Lanz’s opinion is not
reversible error.  The ALJ noted that while Dr. Lanz reported on October 11, 2000, that
Brobst was unable to work and had not been able to hold sustained employment since
1997, Brobst had, in fact, returned to work at the time of the ALJ hearing.  Still further,
several state agency medical experts had opined that Brobst was capable of performing
certain tasks in certain employment settings.
Additionally, the ALJ found that Dr. Lanz’s opinion was inconsistent with his own
clinical findings.  Although Dr. Lanz’s findings supported his view that Brobst was not
able to work in high-stress environments, a view accepted by the ALJ in its conclusion
that Brobst had a RFC to do low-stress, light work, the findings did not support Dr.
5Lanz’s conclusory determination that Brobst could not perform any sustained
employment.  Dr. Lanz found among other things that Brobst’s behavior and psychomotor
activity were socially appropriate, that Brobst was well-spoken when not severely
stressed, and that Brobst had adequate intelligence, was fully oriented, had an adequate
memory, and had no language or communication deficits.
Brobst further contends that the ALJ’s step-four analysis was flawed because he
failed to credit Brobst’s subjective complaints of pain and symptoms.  Substantial
evidence in the form of Dr. Lanz’s findings that Brobst could engaged in SGA in a low-
stress environment and reports of Brobst’s relatively extensive daily activities (including
cooking, driving, shopping, vacuuming, walking, mowing the lawn and taking out the
trash) supported the ALJ’s refusal to credit Brobst’s subjective complaints.  See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(a) (a claimant’s complaints must be supported by objective medical evidence
which could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms in order to support
the existence of a disability).
Finally, Brobst challenges the ALJ’s step-five conclusion that Brobst could
perform other jobs existing in significant number in the national economy on grounds that
the ALJ improperly relied on the testimony of a vocational expert (VE) that Brobst had
the ability to perform low-stress, sedentary employment.  The VE responded affirmatively
when asked by the ALJ whether a person of Brobst’s age, education, vocational profile,
and RFC could perform the jobs of a data processing clerk, audit clerk, and administrative
6detail clerk.  Brobst argues that the ALJ’s crediting of the VE’s testimony was erroneous
because, when cross-examined by Brobst’s counsel, the VE testified that a person of
Brobst’s characteristics who was so affected by impairments that he could not stay on task
and complete assignments could not perform jobs in the national economy.  We agree
with the district court that the ALJ’s decision not to credit the VE’s testimony on cross-
examination was not error because such testimony was elicited by a question depicting a
hypothetical person of lesser abilities and stamina than Brobst himself.  See Roberts v.
Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 184 (9 th Cir. 1995) (ALJ is free to accept or reject restrictions
presented in a hypothetical question propounded by a claimant’s counsel as long as
substantial evidence supports the decision) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
